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Identity, values and norms of East Africa’s youth
Alex O. Awiti and Caleb Orwa
The East Africa Institute, Aga Khan University - Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
ABSTRACT
With a median age estimated at 18 years, East Africa is one of the
youngest regions in the world. However, relatively little research has
been conducted to understand how they identify themselves and what
values and norms shape or inﬂuence them. About 7,000 individuals
between the age of 18 and 35 were interviewed in Kenya, Tanzania,
Rwanda and Uganda. Youth constructed their identity along four dimen-
sions; youth (age-associated); nationality; faith; family. However, country,
religion, gender and age inﬂuenced the ordering of identity. With the
exception of Rwanda, East African a tolerance for rule violation and
corruption was prevalent among East African youth. This diﬀerence
oﬀers hope because it demonstrates that respect for the rule of law,
unequivocal commitment to integrity and public accountability can be
enforced and transmitted to the next generation, the youth. Values and
norms are shaped by and co-evolve with institutions and norms of the
wider society.
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Introduction
This paper focuses on four member states of the East African Community (EAC), namely: Kenya;
Rwanda; Tanzania and Uganda. Like other sub regions of Africa, the EAC is in the early stages of
demographic transition, which is characterized by high fertility rates, and a signiﬁcant decline in
infant and child mortality rates. Consequently, this has created an unprecedented youth bulge.
Based on available national level population census data, about over 70 percent of the population
in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are below the age of 35. The median age across the
region is estimated to be 18 years, with Uganda, the second youngest country in Africa having
a median age of about 16 years, two years younger than Africa’s median age, which is projected to
raise only modestly to about 25 years in 2050 (Canning, Raja, & Yazbeck, 2015).
Politicians and public sector policy makers have tended to view the youth in terms of the social
and political risk and/or the potential economic boon or dividend potential they present for their
societies. The EAC youth policy recognizes that the youth are critical to developing and sustaining
the Community (East African Community, 2014). Moreover, youth are associated with values, norms
and identities that considered deviant or at odds with mainstream, or more traditional cultures
values or norms. For example, Tanzania’s youth policy is wary of, and seeks to respond to changing
and deviant lifestyle – new cultures, new values and orientations – associated with the youth
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2007). Similarly, the Rwandan youth policy recognizes the need to
continuously educate the youth on Rwandan culture and values (Republic of Rwanda, 2015).
Uganda’s youth policy laments that urban youth have an inclination to cultural identity or values
in conﬂict with society and established structures and traditions (Republic of Uganda, 2001).
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As such this policy backdrop is critical to connecting the political and social structures that undergird
and shape youth subjectivity. To a large extent, the tenor of patronage that permeates national policy
frameworks inﬂuences how youth think about their own agency in navigating pathways of transition.
East African youth are largely perceived by adults as vulnerable to the pervasive inﬂuence of western
cultures, and more recently, radicalization by terrorists groups. The generational contestation of values
and norms; what is acceptable and what is abhorrent is gathering steam in the East Africa region and
Africa in general, especially in thewake of globalization, surge in global terrorism (Devine, 2017) and the
rise of what more conservative segments of society might consider as permissive inclinations.
Literature review
Early writings, philosophical writings (Katuin, 1920) suggest that values are functional and are
relevant to the concrete conditions or context in which they are formed and shaped. Moreover,
empirical work identify a ‘cultural shift’ in the Western cultures, towards more individualistic
orientations signiﬁed by the decline in the inﬂuence of traditional and social institutions in shaping
values (Heelas, Lasch, & Morris, 1996a; Inglehart 1990). The surge in dominance of self-eﬃcacy has
grown in parallel with the diminution is external authority and allegiance to tradition and agency
and decision-making power on what is wrong or right increasingly vested in the individual.
The framing of the objectives youth policies, around safeguarding tradition, cultural values,
identity and preventing deviance speaks to an intergenerational contest of values. What is an
authentic and independent (as opposed to dominant societal norms attitudes and values) remains
a complex, enduring question. Mannheim, 1928) advanced the concept of generation, in which the
formative years, especially adolescence is shaped by profound and long-lasting eﬀects of social
circumstances and historical events. Moreover, the proliferation of mobile technologies, especially
the exchange and dissemination of images have become a medium for production and transmis-
sion of youth peer culture, where youth are in the active enterprise of constituting, negotiating and
reconstituting their sense of self (Buckingham, 2008).
Giddens (1991) uses the disembedding to represent shifting alignments and restructuring of
norms and values across time and space. Henrich and Boyd (1998) argues that processes of
conformist transmission of values, beliefs and inﬂuence individuals strongly and hence can produce
diﬀerences across space and time. Furthermore, Thomas and Holland (2004) suggest that framing
of values is associated with beliefs, identities, attitudes, norms and practices, which reﬂect fungible
material assets, status, and aspirations. Hence economic systems and social institutions and busi-
ness cultures can shape values (Bowels, 2011).
What is the prevailing socio-economic and cultural context in which East African youth are being
raised? Wiegratz and Cesnulyte (2016) observed that in Kenya and Uganda a money rationale, indivi-
dualism, self-interested and fraudulent practices are increasingly recognized as acceptable necessary or
legitimized because they aid people’s urgent need for prosperity, success and status in an environment
fraught with uncertainty. Experiments show that incentives that appeal to material self-interest often
undermine interpersonal trust, reciprocity, fairness, and public generosity (Bowels, 2011).
Markets and other neo-liberal institutions tend to erode family and traditional norms andprivilege self-
interest, materialism, individualism and rule violation as new sites for moral conﬁguration (Bowels, 2011;
Thomas & Holland, 2004). While market-led systems do not inevitably generate the requisite supportive
norms and values, the corrosive eﬀects of self-interested strategicmodeof reasoning are counterbalanced
by the rule of law and strong institutions. But the counterbalancing eﬀect of the rule of law East Africa and
Africa in general is limited. The Ibrahim Index of AfricanGovernance 2017 report shows that the rule of law
has declined in 37 out of 54 African countries. Many negative forces such as weak institutions, impunity,
state capture and corruption undermine eﬀorts to attain the rule of law. More speciﬁcally, the scourge of
desecrates the principle of the rule of law and systematically destroys the fabric of society and good
governance in a majority of African countries.
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For example, stories about corruption, dishonest behavior and the use of deception for eco-
nomic gain abound in print, electronic and social media in three of East Africa’s largest economies.
The National Youth scandal in Kenya,1 the Tegeta Escrow Account scandal in Tanzania2 and the Bidi
Bidi refugee camp scandal in Uganda.3 Moreover, examination fraud is now widespread, eroding
conﬁdence in the education system at all levels in Uganda,4 Kenya5 and Tanzania.6 Other forms
dishonest behavior such as include tax evasion, counterfeiting and sale of unlicensed and illicit
brews is rampant in East Africa. It is estimated that Uganda and Tanzania governments lose
$1.4 billion and $1.5 billion in annual revenues to illicit trade respectively, while Kenya loses over
$350 million.7
Mutunga (2014) argues that the crisis facing Kenya, like other African countries – tribalism,
corruption, weak governance, poverty and underdevelopment – are a reﬂection of the quality of
the elite (politicians, businessmen, clergy, civil servants, academics, police and judges), who are
largely driven by self-interest, greed, opportunism and materialism. These elite are also highly
regarded as role models, hence their dishonest practices can set bad examples for the youth and
society in general (Cohn, Fehr, & Marechal, 2014). Moreover, since they are well connected in
society, the elite who engage in dishonest practices including corruption and tax evasion often
manipulate or subvert the rule of law and often go unpunished. The unethical behavior of socially
and economically dominant elite can inﬂuence in a negative and corrosive way of ordinary, less
powerful or privileged citizens. More importantly, together with the material gains to be made
from dishonesty, and the fact that the rule of law is ﬂexible or malleable, individuals engage in
a cost beneﬁt analysis, which determines that corruption or fraud is proﬁtable.
In a conversation, an editor for a leading Ugandan newspaper remarked that corruption stories do not
drive readership and circulation anymore. In a sense corruption or fraud is not sensational or outrageous
but rather normal. Since perpetrators of corruption go unpunished or buy protection and thus insulated
fromdueprocess.Moreover, because the categorizationof theft or plunder of public resources orﬁnancial
impropriety is ambivalent, and people think of their own dishonest actions as justiﬁed or socially
acceptable, and somehow re-calibrating their moral self-image (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002).
How East Africa’s youth understand and navigate their world; their attitudes, values and norms
are predicated on and inﬂuenced by saliency of dishonesty and the abundant perception that
corruption is proﬁtable and aids access to enormous privilege and power. The ubiquity of
dishonest behavior of all forms, as evidenced by coverage in social, print and electronic media
directly inﬂuences and changes the understanding of norms, values and attitudes related to ethics
and morality in general. What Edmund Burke wrote in the 18th century is particularly pertinent to
countries experiencing a youth bulge. ‘Tell me what are the prevailing sentiments that occupy the
minds of your young men, and I will tell you what is to be the character of the next generation.’
Fundamentally, youth attitudes, values and norms will determine the character of East Africa now
and its place in the global community of nations.
The study draws from the understanding that social context, which reﬂect material assets and
associated status inﬂuences values, attitudes (Thomas & Holland, 2004), and determines the types
of norms – what is commonly done (normal to do) or what is commonly approved (socially
sanctioned) that people will attend to. Equally instructive is the emergence the social and
economic pressures associated with primordial neo-liberal market order – mundane basic survival
needs and the glamor and luxury of a globalized consumer market – tends to displace or erode
trust, integrity, reciprocity and fairness, especially where rule of law is feeble and insuﬃcient to
engender civic cultures (Bowels, 2011; Wiegratz & Cesnulyte, 2016).
This study aims to provide a more nuanced basis for engaging and supporting the youth
through their transition to adulthood and to serve as an impetus for both an intergenerational
as well as a multi-stakeholder dialogue about a Kenyan or Rwandan or Tanzanian or Ugandan
character. Are there similarities or diﬀerences – in identity, values, norms and aspirations –
among youth in the four East African countries, and why? Moreover, the study seeks to
contribute to building a coherent understanding of how East African youth navigate dynamic
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socio-economic and institutional contexts in constructing or deconstructing or conforming to
dominant structures of identity, values, and norms.
Methodology
The questionnaire
Prior to developing the questionnaire, a one-day regional consultation was held in Nairobi Kenya,
which brought together four youth leaders (two females and two males) from each of the four
countries – Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The purpose of the dialogue was to canvass
youth perspectives on what was relevant to determining their current circumstances and what will
shape their future. A wide range of issues emerged; family, faith, unemployment, entrepreneurship,
poverty, attitude, integrity, corruption, education, citizenship, security, sex and reproductive health,
globalization, regional integration politics and government. A more detailed exploration and
analysis of what would determine their agency to inﬂuence the present and the future revealed
four issues; identity, values, norms and aspirations. These issues were used to design the
questionnaire.
One consultationwas held in each of the four countries, bringing together 50 youth leaders to provide
local nuance and validation of the perspectives and issues that emerged in regional forum. The detailed
questionnaire questionnaires administered in each country explored questions around eight themes.
Thesewere: i) identity; ii) values; iii) norms; iv) empowerment (sense of inclusion, and civic participation); v)
themedia; vi) sexual and reproductive health; and, vii) aspirations; viii) the future. Review of similar studies
was used to further inform the survey design (British Council, 2013; Ono, 2005).
Validity was established by a panel of reviewers who agreed that items in the questionnaire
were of suﬃcient readability, clarity and comprehensiveness and from a content perspective,
represented fully the domains of identity, values, norms and aspirations. A pre-test or pilot was
conducted in each country to assess the clarity of the items and to ascertain that the respondents
interpreted and answered the questions as intended. The study was conducted in accordance with
the ethical standards in all the four countries. The study goals were explained to all the respon-
dents and written informed consent was obtained.
Sample
The universe of the sample is individuals, male and female, between the age of 18 and 35 in Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The African Youth Charter and the EAC Youth Policy deﬁne youth
as persons aged between 15 and 35 years. The deﬁnition of youth, by age, varies among the
countries of the EAC. Rwanda deﬁnes youth as persons aged between 14 and 35 years while in
Kenya, youth are individuals aged between 18 and 35 years (Republic of Kenya, 2006). In Tanzania
youth are persons aged between 15 and 35 years. In Uganda youth are individuals aged between
18 and 30 years. A total of 6984 individuals between the age of 18 and 35 years were interviewed.
The sample size in each country was based on the proportion of the population between 18 and
35 years old in each of the four countries. Due to lack of recent, up to date census data, we relied
upon the most recent population projections. The sampling was distributed as follows: Kenya,
1,865; Rwanda, 1,335; Tanzania, 1,939; and, Uganda, 1845. The sample size in each country was
derived bases on a 95% Conﬁdence Level and a Conﬁdence Interval of ± 3%. Overall, 57% of the
individuals interviewed were male and 54% of the total sample was drawn from urban areas.
A multi-stage sampling approach was applied as follows:
Stage 1: Selection of the primary sampling unit, which in this survey was country and its oﬃcial
administrative units for the country e.g. region in Tanzania and Uganda and province in Kenya and
Rwanda were used as the primary sampling units.
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Stage 2: Selection of secondary sampling unit. In this case the lowest administrative (e.g. parish, sub-
location, wards, sectors) unit was selected. A random selection of such a unit with equal probability of
selection was considered representative of all other units contained in the higher order administrative
units (e.g. district). We considered sample take or minimum of 8–10 interviews per randomly selected
secondary sampling unit. By dividing the sample take with the sample allocation at the primary
sampling unit, the number of required secondary sampling units was determined.
Stage 3: Selection of tertiary sampling units within the secondary sampling units, which in this
case are households. The starting point for every cluster of households was identiﬁed with
reference from a landmark starting point, and following the left hand rule a household was
identiﬁed by the calendar date of the survey. For example, 23rd would be the 5th house (2 + 3)
to the left of the identiﬁed landmark. After completing the interview at each selected household,
the left hand rule was applied and every 5th household was selected.
Stage 4: The selection of the respondent. All the adults, aged between 18 and 35 years, in the
household were listed and where there was more than one eligible youth the Kish Grid selection table
(Kish, 1949) was used to select an eligible respondent, this case youth (male of female) between 18 and
35 years.
Data analysis
All analyses were conducted using R (Available from: http://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/R-intro.
html#Making-data-frames). To understand the relationship among response categories we used
correspondence analysis (CA). CA is based on the analysis of the contingency table through the row
and column proﬁles. Row proﬁles correspond to the relative frequencies of the diﬀerent response
categories among variable categories. The column proﬁles correspond to the relative frequencies
of diﬀerent response categories within each variable.
We use CA to represent the relative frequencies in terms of distances between individual row
and column proﬁles and the distance to the average row and column proﬁle, respectively, in low
dimensional space (Johnson and Wichern, 2007). CA decomposes the variance or dispersion by
identifying the most important deviations from independence (Friendly, 2000). Typically Dimension
1 represents the largest amount of explained variance, while dimension 2 explains the second
largest. The determination of the number of dimensions to retain is based on the same rules
applied in Principle Components Analysis, where the number of dimensions retained represent
more than 70 % of the variability. More importantly, the interpretation of a CA map reveals
relationships that would otherwise not be detected through a pairwise comparison.
More importantly, a key advantage of CA is that no underlying distribution assumptions are
required, hence it can take any type of categorical variable, binary, ordinal or nominal (Higgs,
1991). Moreover, CA goes beyond pairwise correlations or tests of association as the graphical
display shows how response categories from two or more variables cluster together.
Results
Youth and identity
East African youth identify themselves along ﬁve dimensions, namely: youth (age-associated); citizen;
faith; family and tribe or ethnicity. About 40 % of the respondents said they were youth ﬁrst, 34%
identiﬁed ﬁrst as nationals or citizens of their respective countries; 11% identiﬁed themselves by their
faith ﬁrst; 6% identiﬁed as members of their family ﬁrst and 3.5 % of the youth (in Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda) identiﬁed by their tribe or ethnicity ﬁrst. Correspondence Analysis (CA) revealed diﬀerent
patterns in ordering of identity among the four countries (Figure 1). The Tanzanian youth identiﬁed
predominantly as young person or youth while Ugandan youth identiﬁed more with family. The
identity of Ugandan the Ugandan youth was associated with family, place of residence (town or
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village), a sense of belonging to East African and their tribe. In both Kenya and Rwanda nationality or
citizenship and faith were the most important dimensions of identity.
While rank ordering was observed of identity among East African youth, such identities were not
static. East African youth were indeed reconﬁguring their identities or the essence of who they are
between age 18 and 35 years, which was perhaps related to progressive developmental shifts and
life-stage needs associated with transition out of the youth age band. Figure 2 shows that between
the ages of 18 and 25 years, the respondents identiﬁed themselves as strongly as youth. During this
period dimensions of identity such as family, faith, nationality and were less salient.
Conversely, respondents in the 26–35 age band identiﬁed the least as youth. The study revealed that
the proportion of youthwho identiﬁed as youth ﬁrst declined by 52%between the age of 18 and 35 years.
This is despite the fact that the legal deﬁnition of youth in East Africa extends to 35 years. Moreover, youth
aged 26–30 years had a close association with community or country, projecting a strong sense of
allegiance to country. They were also provincially inclined, associating with their towns, cities or villages.
This suggests an orientation to connection to place, whether country or community (village or town).
Our data suggests that ethnic, familial and religious dimensions of identity were ampliﬁed between 18
and 35 years. There was an ascendance in the salience of tribe, family, faith. Youth aged 31–35 years
identiﬁed with faith, family and tribe. A sense of belonging to East Africa was also stronger among youth
aged 31–35 years. This apparent family and clan centric tendency is in contrast with themore nationalistic
and sense of connectedness to community exhibited by youth in the 26–30 years age band.
The age-associated re-conﬁguration of identity reﬂects conformity with mainstream societal norms.
Moreover, this reconﬁguration of identities also revealed diﬀerences between countries. In Kenya for
example, the proportion of youth who identify by ethnicity increased by 95% from 4% to 7.8% between
the ages of 21 and 35 respectively. These ﬁndings suggest strong ethnic inclinations in the Kenyan society.
Similar patterns of ampliﬁcation of the salience of ethnic identity were observed in Uganda where the
proportion of youth who identiﬁed ﬁrst by their ethnicity increased by 65%between 18 and 35 years. The
converse was true Tanzania where ethnicity as a dimension of identity remained stable between 18–-
35 years. Since the genocide questions that require citizens to reveal ethnic identity are not permitted by
Rwandan authorities.
In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda religion or faith was an important factor in ordering identity
among East African youth (Figure 3). Tribal or ethnic identity was more salient among Muslim
Figure 1. Ordering of identity by country.
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Figure 2. Age-associated diﬀerences in identity.
Figure 3. Association between religion and identity.
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youth compared to youth who professed the Christian faith. Identity among Muslim respondents
was constructed around their tribe, being East African and a strong sense of being youth.
Respondents of the Christian faith constructed their identity around family and citizenship.
The or role inﬂuence of religion in ordering the dimensions of identity was more prominent in
Kenya. For example, while a majority (41%) of Kenyan respondents identiﬁed as Kenyans ﬁrst, 22%
of Kenyan Muslim youth respondents identiﬁed as Kenyans ﬁrst. About 54% of youth respondents
of Islamic faith identiﬁed as youth ﬁrst compared to 34% of youth respondents of Christian faith
who identiﬁed as youth ﬁrst. Similarly, 29% more youth of Islamic faith identiﬁed by their ethnicity
compared to youth who professed the Christian faith. Conversely in Tanzania faith did not
inﬂuence how youth identiﬁed themselves – as youth, citizens or by ethnicity. For example, an
equal proportion (24%) of Christian and Muslim youth identiﬁed as Tanzanian citizens. Similarly,
59% of Christian respondents and 60% of Christian respondents identiﬁed as youth respectively.
Values, norms and aspirations
About 80% of the youth interviewed valued faith ﬁrst; 50% valued work and family ﬁrst;37% valued
wealth ﬁrst and, 25% valued freedom ﬁrst, while integrity was the most important value for 7% of
the respondents. Although the values structure was broadly similar among youth in the four
countries, there were age associated diﬀerences in values structure (Figure 4).
Youth aged 18–20 years associated with values around freedom, friend, while the values of
youth aged 21–25 were associated with country or their nationality. Youth aged 26–30 asso-
ciated with the values of integrity, family and faith. Moreover, 31–35 year old youth valued
work and wealth most.
Our results suggest substantial gender diﬀerences in value priorities between male and female
respondents (Figure 5). Female respondents were strongly associated with family, freedom and
faith, while male respondents gravitated toward values like work and wealth. The value orienta-
tions reﬂects a dichotomy based on concern and responsibility for others by females, and an
orientation to transaction and material beneﬁt by male youth.
Figure 4. Age-associated diﬀerences in values among East African youth.
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Country diﬀerence in value priorities were observed, in four distinct quadrats as illustrated in the
Correspondence Analysis biplot (Figure 6). Tanzanian youth valued integrity, wealth, and work.
Rwandan youth were strongly associated with allegiance to country; they valued of nationalism
ﬁrst. Kenyan youth associated with family, faith and friends. Ugandan youth were associated with
Figure 5. Gender-associated diﬀerences in values priorities among East African youth.
Figure 6. Country-level diﬀerences in values among East African Youth.
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the values of environment, and freedom. Moreover, their adjacency to the values of faith and family
were signiﬁcant.
In further explorations of values and norms, the study probed perceptions and choices or actions to
determine whether youth: i) admired people who use get rich quick schemes; ii) would do anything to
get money; iii) would easily take a bribe; iv) would easily take a bribe; v) believed it did not matter how
one made money; vi) believed there was nothing wrong with corruption; and, vii) electoral bribery.
The study revealed that about 60% of the youth admired those who use get rich quick schemes;
55% believed it did not matter how one made money; 53% would do anything to get money; 37%
would take or give a bribe; 35% believed there was nothing wrong with corruption. While 74% of
the youth believed it was important to vote about 70% were vulnerable to electoral bribery and
about 40% would only vote for a candidate who paid them.
Youth in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were broadly similar with regard to: i) taking a bribe; ii) giving
a bribe; iii) perception that there is nothing wrong with corruption. Between 35–44% youth in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda would take or give a bribe. For Rwandan youth, corruption was wrong and
a majority of Rwandan youth strongly disagreed with the proposition that they would easily take or
give bribe.
Figure 7 illustrates diﬀerences and similarities in the perceptions among youth with regard to
taking or giving a bribe, on corruption, and how one made money. Kenyan youth did not agree
with the proposition that it did not matter how one made money, and that they would do anything
to make money. Conversely, Tanzanian youth said believed it did not matter how one got money,
and they would do anything to made money.
Rwandan youth would not take or give a bribe. Conversely, Ugandan youth would easily take or
give a bribe, and believed there was nothing wrong with corruption, a perception that was shared
by Tanzanian youth. On the contrary, Rwandan and Kenyan youth did not agree that with the
proposition that there was nothing wrong with corruption.
The norms and attitudes of the youth were not without contradiction. While 60% of the youth
admired those who use get rich quick schemes and 55% believed it did not matter how one made
Figure 7. Perceptions of East African youth on corruption and bribery.
10 A. O. AWITI AND C. ORWA
money, 76% believed they would succeed if they worked hard. When asked about the future, 58%
of the youth believed their societies would be wealthier materially in the future, only 48% believed
the future would be oﬀer more opportunities for them and 44% believed that their societies would
reward hard work and 34% of East African youth believed their societies would be poorer in ethics
and values. However, 80% are optimistic and see the glass as half full.
Overall, East African youth appeared somewhat uncertain about what the future had in store for
them. However, Rwandan youth were unequivocal in their conﬁdence in the future. About 85% of
Rwandan youth believed their country was going in the right direction and would grow richer
materially. Moreover, 70% believed their country would provide more opportunities for the youth
and another 75% believed their country would reward hard work and 51% believed values and
ethics would not deteriorate or erode in the future. Conversely, Tanzanian youth were pessimistic,
less conﬁdent in the future, with less than 35% of Tanzanian youth believing their country would
grow richer or oﬀer more opportunities for youth. Furthermore, 34% of Tanzanian youth believed
their society would be poorer in ethics and values while 24% of the youth believed hard work
would be rewarded in their society.
The ordering of life aspirations or life goals among East African youth is illustrated in Figure 8.
Youth aged 18–20 years are pre-occupied completing or furthering their education and ﬁnding
a job. Moreover, youth aged 21–25 years were pre-occupied with starting a family. However, they
were not totally free from the encumbrances of ﬁnding a job.
Figure 8. Age-associated diﬀerences life goals.
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Youth aged 26–30 years wanted to own a car and house. Moreover, youth aged 31–35 were pre-
occupied with career advancement and a desire to join politics. The divergence of their life goals or
aspirations of youth suggests that perhaps the 18–35 years age band is too broad as a basis for
determining reliable policy interventions as well a social mechanisms for supporting youth to
transition fully into adulthood.
Discussion
Youth and identity
East African youth are in dynamic process of ﬁnding and re-conﬁguring their identities along ﬁve
key dimensions. First they identify as youth, providing a sense of internal cohesion and solidarity.
Identity as youth is also consistent with the policy and legal categorizations by society and state
that establish youth as socially distinct category. This distinct identity as youth bolsters a sense of
esprit de corps; a sense of belonging that also confers a degree of social entitlement as well as
shared grievance. It is not uncommon in East Africa to hear youth agitate for aﬃrmative action to
set aside special seats for youth in parliament or cabinet and prequaliﬁcation for or ring fencing
youth quotas for government tenders. Where youth perceive systematic disempowerment or
disenfranchisement such strong group identity could pose social and political risks as sense of
grievance solidiﬁes around the age factor.
The study identiﬁed age-related changes with regard to rank-order of identity. As they grow
older, citizenship, faith and ethnic dimensions of identity take prominence. This re-ordering of
identities is perhaps inﬂuenced by the developmental changes as well as social, political and
religious cultures of individual countries. For example, the age-associated surge in prominence of
ethnic identity unique to Kenyan youth but consistent with the pre-eminence of ethnic identity in
Kenya’s political economy.
In Kenya’s nascent democracy, political competition is essentially a duel among disparate and
ephemeral ethnic coalitions for economic rents (Miguel, 2004; Kwatemba, 2008; Afrobarometer,
2008). Kenya’s ethnic communities are expected to mobilize politically to support and protect
powerful ethnic elites to retain power and in turn appropriate and allocate public goods and
services as well as appointments in government. The reality in Kenya is that ethnicity is a signiﬁcant
determinant in allocation of public resources (public service appointments, government contracts
as well as public services such as roads, schools and healthcare). Moreover, Kenya’s political elite
has preyed on ethnic division as mechanism for political competition.
Perhaps the surge in salience of ethnic identity among 30–35 year old youth is in conformity with
the exigencies of adulthood – ﬁnding employment and or business opportunities. As they grow older,
they realize that reciprocity is ethnically determined and networks are essentially ethnic. Hence, the
age-related changes with regard to rank-order of identity dimensions reﬂect progressive develop-
mental shifts as well as trajectories of conformity with mainstream adult orientations, attitudes and
values. The age-related accentuation of ethnic distinctiveness observed in Kenya is in sharp contrast to
a more stable and muted sense of ethnic identity in socially cohesive Tanzania.
Conversely, since its founding, unlike Kenya, Tanzania has focused on diminishing the promi-
nence of ethnic identity. Ethnic identity is perceived as antithetical to social cohesion and the ideals
of nation building. Shivji (201I) argues that Tanzania’s ﬁrst President, Julius Nyerere, projected
nationalism as counter identity to ethnicity or tribalism, emphasized the need to weave a nation
out of a tribe and resisted the politicization of ethnicity. Tanzania’s ruling party elite has consis-
tently drummed up the ethos of Ujamaa – equitable economic production and distribution of
public resources to drive social cohesion and economic progress (Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003) and
insisted that civility and mutual respect must be the core of public dialogue and political debate.
In Rwanda, ethnicity as an identity has been outlawed following the 1994 genocide out of
fear that it would cause a resurgence of interethnic tensions (Hilker, 2009). President Museveni
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of Uganda believes that religious and ethnic based identity is primitive, and has argued that
Uganda will be ‘fully evolved’ when tribal, clan, and religious identities are inconsequential
(Museveni, 1997). Nobel Peace Prize laureate Wangari Maathai advocated for increased partici-
pation by youth to promote social cohesion based on shared identities that transcend ethnic
lines (Maathai, 2008).
This study suggests that Muslim youth in Kenya, unlike their counterparts in Rwanda, Tanzania
or Uganda are inclined to a separate identity that disassociates them from the Kenyan polity.
Mwakimako and Willis(2014) argue that with limited economic prospects, Muslim youth believe
they are victims of systematic and institutionalized discrimination by the Kenyan state. Kenya’s anti-
terror war has been characterized by bombing Al Shabab targets in Somalia and extrajudicial
killings of Muslim clerics in the coast, arrest, detention of youth and women of Somali origin, who
happen to be Muslims. It is therefore highly likely that historical discrimination coupled with
extreme security measures in the name of ﬁghting terrorism has emboldened a sense of alienation,
a feeling of non-belonging among Muslim populations, who in turn cleave to their ethnicities and
take refuge in the esprit de corps of being young Muslims. Although the collapse of the one-party
hegemony has touched of an upsurge of conﬂict and social fragmentation in Tanzania (Campbell,
1999), ethnicity and religion have not been politicized to the same levels observed in Kenya.
The dimensions of identity are critical staging platforms for meaning and sense making and
provide an important context for understanding the basis, origin and evolution of attitudes, norms
and orientations, as well as practices. These results underscore the importance of understanding
social context in the construction of youth identity. Our ﬁndings illustrate how meanings and
practices derived from mainstream culture, political and institutional settings, normative and
symbolic groupings of belonging (youth, religion) and historical path dependence determine the
dimensions and ordering of identity.
Values, norms and aspirations
East African youth attach great importance to faith, work, family, wealth and freedom. Similarly, the
youth attach great importance to tradition and consider their parents as vital role models.
A majority of East Africans are adherents of Christianity and Islam. Prayer and deference to God/
Allah is common both in public and in private. Religion for most East Africans is part of who they
are; the expectation is religious aﬃliation and public expression or display of religious inclination
rather than an adherence based upon acceptance of the canons of the faith they subscribe to.
Hence, it is not surprising that while youth say religion is important, they have no qualms about
resorting to or deploying any means to make money, and they admire those who use get rich quick
schemes. Only 30% of the youth surveyed were categorical about not taking bribe in exchange for
their vote. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that about 37% of the youth would take or give
a bribe and that 35% of the youth believed there was nothing wrong with corruption. Moreover,
only 40% of the youth interviewed believed it was important to pay taxes. These ﬁndings point
toward attitudes, which are tolerant of corruption and electoral fraud. According to the East Africa
Bribery Index 2017, published by Transparency International bribery remains rampant in East Africa.
The public services institutions surveyed were police, judiciary, local government, and education
and tax services.
Rule violation, expressed through tax evasion and corruption is generally rampant and some-
what acceptable in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Tanzania’ s President John Magufuli campaigned
on a platform of integrity and restoration of an ethos of hard work, ‘Hapa Kazi Tu’. Kenya’s
President Uhuru Kenyatta has said that he is frustrated by rampant and enduring corruption
despite his best eﬀorts to curb the vice (The Standard, 2016).8 Recognizing that corruption is an
impediment to development and it poses a major challenge to good governance, President Yoweri
Museveni has declared war on corruption and lamented that the ﬁghting corruption has become
complex because educated (elite) public oﬃcials are adept at concealing evidence.9
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Headlines such as: ‘11 major scandals that hit the Jubilee government’; ‘How corrupt
Tanzanian leaders hide their billions10’; ‘High-proﬁle corruption scandals registered under
NRM11’, are not uncommon in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Mutunga (2014) has characterized
the Kenyan elites, who are not diﬀerent from the rest of East Africa’s elite, as embedded in
a materialistic arms race, survival of the ﬁttest, and without any moral qualms. Similarly,
Wiegratz (2016) argues that fraud in its various manifestation, including corruption and rule
violation are a manifestation of new liberal neo-liberal moral order especially among the
powerful elite. Neo-liberal market-like incentives tend to erode the foundations of traditional
ethical commitments (family, community and religion) in favour of self-interest and opportu-
nism, especially where rule of law is feeble and insuﬃcient to engender civic cultures.
This study conﬁrms that attitudes tolerant or evening approving of corruption exist side by side
among the youth – without contradiction – with high levels of religious piety (over 80% of youth
say faith is the most important value). To understand the apparent dissonance between high
religious piety and tolerance and acceptance of corruption one needs to take into account
the public sectors that have the highest prevalence of corruption and bribery. These include: the
police, judiciary, health, registry and licensing, education, utilities and civil registration. While these
sectors oﬀer critical services to the public, onerous bureaucracy and ineﬃciency bog them down.
Moreover, public oﬃcials who hold these positions are beholden to a virulent culture of ethnic and
political patronage and petty rent seeking.
Somehow, these public oﬃcials, especially in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda believe they are
entitled to eat; the public owes them chai (tea). On the other hand, the public generally
believes there was nothing wrong with giving kitu kidogo (something small) in return for
a service given to them by a public oﬃcial. Essentially corruption, giving or taking a bribe,
gets things done and often both parties feel reasonably satisﬁed with the transaction, which is
often tacitly negotiated and mutually agreed upon. In a sense integrity, not taking or not
giving a bribe, is an elastic value, which in these contexts is ambiguous and open to multiple
interpretations. It is instructive to note that in ordinary parlance taking a bribe is viewed simply
as ‘eating’, a normal physiological or biological need for which one must not ﬁnd fault. Hence,
corruption is not categorized purely as an ethical aberration; the circumstance under which one
takes or gives a bribe determines the ethicality of the action. Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) have
shown that when there is ambiguity in categorization of a particular action, one may justify and
categorize their actions in positive terms thus avoiding updating ones moral self-image.
This study reveals that youth in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda generally admire
people who use get rich quick schemes, would do anything to get money as long as they don’t
go to jail and would do anything to get money. However, it is revealing that while youth in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda would go on to easily take or give a bribe, Rwandan youth would
not. Why? Stories like policemen accused of corruption were ﬁred in 2017 or civilians accused
of bribing policemen arrested12 or Ombudsman publishes the list of individuals convicted of
corruption related oﬀences13 are not uncommon. It is therefore likely that Rwandan youth
engage in a cost beneﬁt analysis, which informs the ultimate decision about dishonesty (taking
or giving a bribe or a belief that there was nothing wrong with corruption).
The life goals or aspirations of the youth are instructive and provide insights into the
dynamic This further suggests that there is a dissonance between the legal and policy deﬁni-
tions of youth as a demographic category and how youth think about themselves and what
they care about and aspire to. The pressures associated with achieving life goals or aspirations,
and in general meeting societal expectations. These life pressures, as expected are inherently
material and in many ways might provide motivation for engaging in rule violation. While this
is untested, it is consistent with the work of Wiegratz and Cesnulyte (2016) wo suggest that in
Kenya and Uganda a money rationale, individualism, self-interested and fraudulent practices are
increasingly recognized as acceptable necessary or legitimized because they aid people’s
urgent need for prosperity.
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Conclusion
This study suggest that social and institutional context, are critical determinants of the iden-
tities, values and norms of youth. In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda where rule violation is
prevalent and often goes unpunished youth believe that taking or receiving a bribe is justiﬁ-
able and is not contradictory to their self-perception of integrity or honesty. The exception is
Rwanda. While youth admire get rich quick schemes (personal disposition), the cost of enga-
ging in corruption (social and institutional sanctions) – taking or receiving a bribe – outweighs
the beneﬁts and hence serves as strong deterrent. Accordingly, morals and values are acquired
in the context of social interaction and emanate from a combination of socialization experi-
ences, situational circumstances and group values.
In essence, youth people are the mirror image of the adult world around them. Rwanda’s
example oﬀers hope. Any eﬀorts toward changing or modelling positive values or norms ought
to start the adults – from the family to community to the national level. Rwanda exempliﬁes
the importance strong leadership and an unequivocal commitment to shaping the social and
institutional context through that demand personal integrity and public accountability, hence
inﬂuencing attitudes, values, norms and perceptions of the youth. More importantly, this study
suggests 18–35 is perhaps too wide a demographic continuum along which to build coherent
and responsive policies and programs to support the developmental needs and aspirational
goals of a complex and diverse group. Moreover, the gender diﬀerence in how male and
female deﬁne who they are, is critical especially in the light of the ﬁnding that women aged
26–35 don’t consider themselves youth in the same way their male counterparts do.
Notes
1. Kenyan oﬃcials arrested in ‘$90m’ graft scandal. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenya-suspects-
arrested-in-NYS-scandal/4552908-4583732-a9h69m/index.html.
2. Tegeta escrow will go down in history as a major scandal. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/-Tegeta-
escrow-will-go-down-in-history-as-a-major-scandal-/1840392-2575094-oumj96z/index.html.
3. The U.N. found only 7,000 refugees, despite Uganda’s claim that thousands more needed aid https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/03/22/uganda-refugee-camp-united-nations-corruption/440047002/.
4. Cheating in exams is sophisticated. http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Cheating-in-exams-is-
sophisticated/689364-4277482-pckxb8z/index.html.
5. Shocking details of KCSE exam cheating. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001270003/shocking-
details-of-kcse-exam-cheating.
6. Curbing exam cheating in our schools. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/success/Curbing-exam-cheating-
in-our-schools/1843788-3484752-4gr9xb/index.html.
7. East Africa businesses gear up for ﬁght against illicit trade. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/East-
Africa-businesses-gear-up-for-ﬁght-against-illicit-trade/2560-3349150-m2vh1d/index.html.
8. I am frustrated by corruption, says President Uhuru Kenyatta. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/
2000220200/i-am-frustrated-by-corruption-says-president-uhuru-kenyatta [Accessed March 2018].
9. President Museveni vowswar on corruption, ‘its an openwar’. http://www.statehouse.go.ug/media/news/2017/04/
13/president-museveni-vows-corruption-%E2%80%9Cits-open-war%E2%80%9D [(Accessed January 2018.)
10. How corrupt TZ leaders hide their looted billions. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/How-corrupt-TZ-leaders-
hide-their-looted-bilions/1840340-3203016-1ck01a/index.html [Accessed march 2018].
11. High proﬁle corruption registered under NRM. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/High-proﬁle-
corruption-scandals-registered-under-NRM/688334-1702448-ndh6w6z/index.html [Accessed March 2018].
12. Rwanda ﬁres 200 police oﬃcers accused of corruption https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/rwanda-ﬁres
-200-police-oﬃcers-accused-of-corruption-20170206 [Accessed January 2018].
13. Ombudsman list convicts charged with corruption http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/Rwanda-
names-corruption-oﬀenders/1433218-3935184-fcmd05z/index.html [Accesses March 2018].
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